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Abstract
Since Baier and Bergstrand (2004) there has been a focus on empirically testing the
economic determinants of signing a free trade agreement (FTA). However, FTAs do
not imply an agreement on services; a separate economic integration (EIA) is needed.
As trade in services is one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy, it is
important to pay special attention to these agreements. We use the methodology of
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) to investigate di¤erences in the determinants of signing
an agreement on goods trade and services trade. In addition to the standard economic
variables, we include variables for skilled/unskilled labor, and political stability. We
nd in general, qualitative similarities (though di¤erent magnitudes) and some robust
specic di¤erences.
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1 Introduction
The Trade literature has widely focused on the impact of signing a trade agreement on the
amount of trade in goods between the two countries and consequently the welfare within these
countries. However, less attention has been paid to the economic factors that encourage two
(or more) countries to sign such trade agreements - and even less towards why countries sign
an agreement with respect to services trade. With regards to trade agreements in goods,
Baier and Bergstrand (2004), or B-B, were the rst to provide empirical evidence indicating
which geographical and economic characteristics a¤ect the likelihood of a pair of countries
having a free trade agreement (FTA). The predictions of their model are based on a numerical
version of the theoretical models of Krugman (1991) and Frankel et al. (1995) and covers
agreements that have been signed up to 1996 with a sample of 54 countries. Since 1996,
more than 80 agreements have been signed and the economic characteristics of countries
may have changed. Though we update the data and analysis of B-B, this is not our main
contribution as B-B has already been extended in various contexts.1 Our main contribution
is to compare the determinants of services agreements with goods.
B-B do allow for the trade in services in their theoretical model. However, FTAs do not
actually cover services and thus this aspect is missing from their empirical analysis and we
will argue that an agreement on services trade is more complex than that of an FTA. In
fact, prior to 1996 (the year used in B-B), only ve agreements including both goods and
services had been signed. If two countries want to liberalize trade in services, a separate
agreement is needed; that is, the countries must sign an economic integration agreement
(EIA).2 Since the year 2000, trade in services have increasingly become the subject of bilateral
and multilateral trade negotiations (see Figures 1 and 2). For instance, in 2011, there were
ten trade agreements signed and 7 of those included services. The need for such agreements
stems from a recent increase in services trade. According to the World Trade Organization
1See for example, Baier et al. (2011), Baldwin and Jaimovich (2010), Chen and Joshi (2010), Bergstrand
et al. (2009), and Egger and Larch (2008).
2The terminology we use is based on the World Trade Organization classication of trade agreements.
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(WTO), trade in services represent the fastest growing sector of the global economy and
account for two-thirds of global output, one-third of global employment and nearly 20% of
global trade. Thus, understanding the determinants of agreements on trade in services is an
important topic and main contribution of our paper.
There are two important points that need to be made with regard to the distinction
between agreements concerning services and goods. The rst is that, unlike goods, services
are not restricted by tari¤s, but by market access. When an agreement is signed, the number
of rms allowed in an industry is predetermined, but the quantity provided by each rm is
determined by the market. The second point, that will be discussed in more detail later,
is that unlike an FTA (that implies zero tari¤s on all goods), an EIA does not necessarily
translate to full market access for all or even one type of service. To understand this, we
need to rst describe how trade in services are dened. There are four dened ways, or
modes", of trading services:
 Mode 1: Cross-border supply  the possibility for non-resident service suppliers to
supply services cross-border into the Members territory (e.g. bank transfers).
 Mode 2: Consumption abroad the freedom for the Members residents to purchase
services in the territory of another Member (e.g. tourism).
 Mode 3: Commercial presence the opportunities for foreign service suppliers to es-
tablish, operate or expand a commercial presence in the Members territory, such as a
branch, agency, or wholly-owned subsidiary (e.g. foreign direct investment).
 Mode 4: Presence of natural persons the entry and temporary stay in the Members
territory of foreign individuals in order to supply a service (expatriates).
It is clear that trade in goods is di¤erent than trade in services and though more recent
agreements are covering both goods and services, it is not always the case that an FTA and an
EIA are automatically signed jointly. For instance, EFTA members and Canada negotiated
an FTA in 2009 without an EIA.3 Yet, the decisions to include goods and services are not
necessarily independent either; e.g. Panama and Chile decided to include both goods and
services in a bilateral trade agreement signed in 2008. In particular, Lennon (2009) nds
3EFTA members are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland since 1970.
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that bilateral trade in goods explains bilateral trade in services with a positive estimated
elasticity close to one. Therefore, in addition to evaluating the economic determinants of
trade agreements that cover services, another contribution of this paper is to investigate any
interdependence between an FTA and an EIA.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we explain in the particulars
of an EIA and present the literature related to determinants of trade agreements to provide
theoretical intuition of expected results. Section 3 covers the empirical strategy and the data
used. In Section 4, we present our estimation results and Section 5 concludes.
2 EIA and Theoretical Background
As mentioned the characteristics of an EIA are very di¤erent than that of an FTA. Conse-
quently, it is quite di¢ cult to create one general theoretical model that incorporates all of
the nuances of an EIA. Therefore, we rst provide some brief historical context an EIA and
then rely on various theoretical models to provide the basis for our theoretical predictions.
2.1 Services Under Negotiation
Multilateral negotiations on services started in 1995 with the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) to liberalize trade in services amongst WTO members.4 During negotiation
participating countries decide which principles they want to apply and which sectors will be
covered. In general, not all sectors are covered in each country and the covered sectors are
not identical across countries. For example, in 2005, developed countries had an average
of 106 sub-sectors committed, while developing countries had an average of 42 out of 160
possible sub-sectors (see Adlung and Roy, 2005). In fact, even within country groups, the
average number of sub-sectors committed varies signicantly; from 87 to 117 for developed
countries and from 1 to 123 for developing economies. Therefore, it is clear there is a lot of
4The entire legal text is available on http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm.
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variation in the GATS commitments amongst WTO members. Furthermore, despite good
intentions, the degree of liberalization achieved by the GATS is relatively modest, letting
untapped gains for developing and developed countries that bilateral and multilateral EIAs
try to capture. Though countries negotiate outside of the GATS framework, the content of
an EIA is very similar to that of the GATS with regard to market access, national treatment,
most-favored nation, local presence requirement, right of establishment, among others.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, there has been a clear tendency to include services in
negotiations. In only fteen years (from 1995 to 2010), the number of EIAs increased to 65
agreements in force that took more than thirty years for FTAs/CUs. Despite this tendency,
some trading partners, even recently, still choose to not negotiate over services, but only focus
on goods trade. For instance, the growth has been faster in terms of agreements including
services, without preventing countries from signing pure FTAs. In particular, Figure 2
illustrates that as a share of agreements signed, services are playing a more prominent role,
however there are still agreements signed that only include goods. This indicates, that there
are economic variables driving the decision to negotiate over trade in goods and/or services
and it is not simply an artifact of the times.
2.2 Related literature
We base our approach on B-B in which they provide a theoretical framework to explain the
signature of FTAs between countries. In a six-country model with imperfect competition,
B-B extends Krugman (1991) and Frankel et al. (1995) models. The set up is a basic
Heckscher-Ohlin model characterized by two factors of production and two activities (goods
and services). All rms have the same technology and maximize prots. The goods sector
is capital intensive, while services are labor intensive. In each country, a representative
consumer with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences maximizes utility. These six countries are located
on three continents (two countries on each). Each country has to face intercontinental but
also intracontinental trade costs which are null in Krugman (1991) and Frankel et al. (1995)
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frameworks. They assume that trade within a given continent costs less than trade between
continents.
Several testable predictions arise from B-Bs simulations. The determinants of FTAs are
geographical (based on the di¤erence between intra-continental and intercontinental trade
costs), economic (based on the di¤erence in country sizes) and rely on the di¤erences in factor
endowments between partners but also between the partners and the rest of the world. Using
cross-section data for the year 1996 and 1,431 country-pairs, B-B conrm their predictions.
In fact, for 80% of country-pairs, their model predicts correctly the signature of FTA (or
the absence thereof). To provide an appropriate comparison, we maintain their model but
extend our analysis to consider all FTAs and EIAs signed in or before 2012. We also consider
political variables as an explanatory variable. This is motivated by Baldwin and Jaimovich
(2010) which nds that in addition to economic and geographical determinants, political and
a contagion index explain FTA formations.5
Similar to FTAs, other agreements such as preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and bi-
lateral investment treaties (BITs), tend to be caused by analogous determinants. Bergstrand
et al. (2011) examine the timing of the formation and enlargement of PTAs. They nd that
geography through distance and contiguity, and the economic size of signatories determine
the successful conclusion of a PTA. By introducing the minimum geographical distance and
the number of members of the nearest PTA, Baier et al. (2011) highlight that regionalism
is endogenous and a hump-shaped relationship exists between the number of members of
the nearest PTA and the timing of PTAs. According to Bergstrand and Egger (2011), the
decision to sign a BIT is more likely to occur when countries are similar and large in terms of
economic size, relatively close geographically without having a common border and language.
Political stability and capital-labor ratios are also found to be important factors in determin-
ing the probability to have a BIT. Therefore, we examine economic, geographic, and political
determinants in our empirical analysis to determine the FTAs and EIAs negotiations.
5The spread of regionalism is related to the domino theory developed by Baldwin (1993).
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Turning to the issue of services, there have been various theoretical models. Markusen and
Strand (2008, 2009) adapt the knowledge-capital model (Markusen, 2004) that allows three
types of multinational rms (national, horizontal and vertical) to examine the impacts of
liberalizing trade and investment in business services. Markusen and Strands work highlight
that liberalizing services is mostly welfare-improving for both countries. However, smaller
gains are experienced when trading partners di¤er widely in terms of economic size and factor
endowments. Therefore, as with FTAs, we would expect di¤erences in GDP and capital-labor
ratios to have a negative impact on the signing of EIAs.6 Egger and Shingal (2013) examine
the role of regulation in services trade as an EIA determinant. Furthermore, Egger and Lanz
(2008) nd that large countries and countries involved in FTAs have a higher relative GATS
commitment coverage. This indicates that the decision to sign a trade agreement covering
services may depend on the decision to have signed a trade agreement covering goods. We
address this possible dependency in our robustness checks.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Specications
Discrete choice models allow us to conveniently test why a country-pair has a trade agreement
(see McFadden 1975, 1976). The probability that a given country-pair opts for a particular
alternative is based on the comparison of di¤erent utilities relative to each alternative. The
alternative that provides the highest utility amongst all other alternatives will be chosen.
When a country-pair decides to sign a bilateral trade agreement, it means that each signatory
will be better o¤, in expectation, from this partnership than otherwise. In this framework,
the utility is modeled as a latent variable, y, which is unobservable.
y = 0 + x + e (1)
6B-B actually predict a quadratic relationship between capital-labor ratios and nd a positive relationship.
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where x is the vector of explanatory variables; , the vector of unknown parameters and e
is a normally distributed error term. However, the outcome variable, EIA, is observed
EIA =
8><>: 1 if y
 > 0
0 if y  0
: (2)
Therefore, the general form of the response probability that a country-pair chooses the
alternative EIA = 1 or EIA = 0 is as following:
8><>: P (EIA = 1) = P (y
 > 0)
P (EIA = 0) = P (y  0)
: (3)
Following B-Bs specication, for the country-pair ij, the vector x is dened by two
geographic variables: Naturalij which is the inverse of distance between i and j andRemoteij
which is the simple average of the mean distance between both countries and their partners.
This latter variable is dened as:
Remoteij = dcontij 
8<:
h
log
PN
k=1;k 6=j
dik
(N 1)

+ log
PN
k=1;k 6=i
djk
(N 1)
i
2
9=; (4)
where dist is the bilateral distance in kilometers and dcontij is equal to one if i and j are
located on the same continent, zero otherwise. Economic country sizes are controlled for
with RGDPij and DRGDPij variables. The former corresponds to the sum of the logs of
real GDP of country i and j, while the latter is absolute value of the di¤erence between the
logs of real GDP of both countries.
The variable DKLij is the absolute value of the di¤erence between the logs of capital-
labor ratios of country i and j and the variable SQDKLij is DKLij squared. To compare
with the rest of the world endowments, DROWKLij is introduced and calculated as the
absolute value of the di¤erence between the logs of capital-labor ratios of country i and
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country j and the rest of the worlds capital-labor ratio,
DROWKLij =
1
2
"log
"PN
k=1;k 6=jKkPN
k=1;k 6=i Lk
#
  log

Ki
Li
+
log
"PN
k=1;k 6=jKkPN
k=1;k 6=i Lk
#
  log

Kj
Lj

#
:
The capital-labor ratio permits us to evaluate what each country produces and to what extent
its trading partners are specialized in similar activities. We also use variables constructed
of skilled-unskilled labor ratio since capital-labor ratios can be less relevant in the case of
services, as services are more likely to be labor intensive activities.
We test several specications, some of which assumes that the decision to sign a trade
agreement on services (EIA) is dependent on (or at least correlated with) the decision to
conclude a trade agreement on goods. In this case, a two-step procedure is an appropriate
empirical framework where the rst step consists of whether or not a country-pair is involved
in a bilateral FTA. The second step is estimated and corresponds to whether or not this
country-pair additionally signs an EIA. In the two-step estimation of a bivariate Probit, 
and 0 are jointly normally distributed with correlation of . The second step can be written
as the following:
y0 = 00 + x
00 + 0:
Thus, the two outcomes observed are:
FTA =
8><>: 1 if y
 > 0
0 if y  0
EIA =
8><>: 1 if y
0
> 0
0 if y
0  0
: (5)
As previously noted, x0 is the vector of explanatory variables including Naturalij, Remoteij,
RGDPij, DRGDPij, and the two alternative measures of factor endowments. We assume
that the decision to sign an FTA and the decision to sign an EIA can be mainly explained
by the same variables. However, we expect that some explanatory variables play a di¤erent
role in both decisions.
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3.2 Data
We use the Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS) from the World Trade
Organization (WTO) to build our variables of regional trade agreements (RTAs).7 There
are several types of RTAs that are notied to the WTO; i.e. Preferential Trade Agreement
(PTA), Free Trade Agreement, Economic Integration Agreement, FTA-EIA, PSA-EIA, Cus-
tom Union (CU) and CU-EIA.8 To have a comparable baseline in terms of degree of liberal-
ization in trade in goods, we only consider FTAs and CUs. In general, the aim of both FTAs
and CUs is that each Party shall progressively eliminate its customs duties on originating
goods". The dummy FTA is equal to 1 if two countries are involved in a bilateral FTA
(or CU) in 2012 and 0 otherwise. Additionally, the variable EIA is equal to 1 if two given
countries have signed an agreement covering services and 0 otherwise.9 We lag time-varying
variables such as real GDP and factor endowments to avoid issues of endogeneity. We do not
consider agreements signed before the year in which we use our lagged economic data. This
poses a selection issue for our FTA analysis which we address futher in our Results section.
However we are not too concerned since all but four EIAs were signed before the year our
data comes from.
From the Penn World Tables, we have collected the real GDP for the year 1995.10 Using
this data, we calculate the di¤erence between GDP and the sum of GDP for a given country-
pair. However, we have to deal with the fact that some countries are involved in a common
custom union and negotiate as a bloc with other countries. This is the case for the European
Union, but also of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).11 Note that EFTA is not
a custom union but the members have signed 18 agreements as bloc since conception. In
7See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx.
8Henceforth, PSAs are called Partial Scope Agreement.
9Note that a country pair could be involved in both an FTA and EIA in 2012, but each of these were
signed in di¤erent years. This is a side-e¤ect of our static" model.
10We also complete our analysis with data gathered in the year 2000. There is a trade o¤ here in that we
use data closer to the year of signing, but lose observations of agreements signed between 1995 and 2000.
The results are qualitatively similar and are available upon request.
11European Union composed of 15 countries is Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
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these specic cases, the decision process and welfare comparison is di¤erent as countries do
not negotiate one by one, but one versus a bloc of countries. To account for these blocs, we
generate aggregate countries which represent EU and EFTA by taking the sum of individual
countrys GDP and constructing an average distance.12
Following the methodology of the Extended Penn World Tables, capital-labor ratios are
computed from the estimated capital stock and the number of workers.13 The calculation of
the estimated capital stock is based on Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM):14
Kstockt =
TX
i
(1  d)T i IT i (6)
with
It = Popt RGDP
pc
t k
i
t: (7)
The investment term, It, corresponds to the real investment in year t, obtained from real
investment share of GDP (kit), real GDP per capita in constant dollars (chain index) noted
RGDP pct , and population (Popt) provided by Penn World Tables (PWT).
15 By assumption,
the asset life is 14 years, the depreciation rate, d is 7.5%, and Kstockt is the cumulated
depreciated sum of the past investments. The capital-labor ratio is then the estimated
capital stock, Kstockt , divided by the number of workers, Nt. From the PWT, the number of
workers variable is determined as:
Nt =
Popt RGDP
pc
t
RGDPwt
(8)
with RGDPwt , real GDP per worker in constant dollars. From here, two variables are
generated following B-B: DKLij and DROWKLij.
12Note that the GDP of EU is the sum of its rst 15 members. The two last enlargements are not
considered as most of agreements have been signed after 1995. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) deal with this
bloc issue by considering the share of world GDP of the countries composing a given bloc.
13Extended Penn World Tables are available online. See http://homepage.newschool.edu/~foleyd/epwt/.
14This procedure is detailed in OECD (2001) page 100.
15Penn World Table version 7.0: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt70/pwt70_form.php.
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CEPII provides geographic distances between capital cities, used to generate our Natural
and Remote variables. We use the percentage of tertiary schooling attained in population
and the percentage of no schooling, primary and secondary schooling attained in population,
provided by Barro-Lee educational attainment dataset, to proxy the share of skilled and
unskilled workers respectively.16 Finally, the institutional variable State Fragility Index
(SFI) is provided by the Center for Systemic Peace for the year 1995. It is a general index,
composed by the security, political, economic and social e¤ectiveness and legitimacies.17 A
high SFI is indicative of important state fragility. Our Polity variable is a dummy variable
equal to one if the indices of both countries is below the median of the SFI and zero otherwise.
4 Results
In this section we present our results in four main subsections. The rst section is our
baseline model that assumes the decision to sign an EIA is completely independent of the
two countries having an FTA. Then we move on to assuming that FTA is in some sense a
prerequisite" to signing an FTA. Next, we run a seemingly unrelated model allowing for the
two decisions to be correlated. Finally, we distinguish countries into two groups: developed
and developing.
4.1 Baseline Results
In Table 1, we present our baseline results. We take the potentially naïve assumption that
the decision to sign an EIA is completely independent of the decision to sign an FTA and run
a Probit model in which the choice variable is whether to sign an EIA or not. For comparison,
we include the coe¢ cient signs for an FTA found by B-B. All of our independent variables
are taken from the year 1995 and our dependent variable represents all agreements signed
between 1996 and 2012.
16See http://www.barrolee.com/.
17More details are available on http://www.systemicpeace.org/SFImatrix2009c.pdf.
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Our rst specication in Table 1 corresponds to the main specication in B-B. Though the
signs of all our coe¢ cients except DKL match the signs for an FTA, Remote and DRGDP
are insignicant. The fact that the coe¢ cient for DKL is negative and signicant, this
does not necessarily contradict the typical theory for an FTA as B-B predicted a quadratic
relationship and we could be on the other side of the parabola.18 We then include a variable
for incorporating the State Fragility Index in our next two specications. The coe¢ cient for
Polity is positive and signicant for both specications and DKL becomes insignicant but
still negative. We conclude from this that countries tend to select politically stable partners
which is particularly important for the enforcement of EIAs as negotiations on services do
not deal with observable tari¤ cuts but with market access for foreign suppliers.19
Perhaps it is more appropriate to be concerned with the di¤erences in the ratio of skilled to
unskilled labor when considering an EIA. Therefore, we replace DKL and DROWKL with
DSKUSK and DROWSK for our last specication. With the exception of Remote which
becomes signicant, the results for our coe¢ cients that are present in all three specications
in Table 1 are robust. Similar to our variable DKL, our results suggest that di¤erences
in countriesskilled-unskilled labor ratio lessen the gain for signing an EIA. However, the
di¤erence between the rest of the world is now positive.
There are various ways to determine how well a model ts reality. Generally, actual and
tted values are compared to determine goodness of t of a model. The standard metric
used is the model predicts correctly if the predicted probability is above 0.5 (or below) and
an EIA is actually (not) signed. Thus, all country-pairs involved in an EIA are correctly
classied if the associated predicted probability is such as P  0:5 and incorrectly classied
if P  0:5. The di¤erent options for a given country-pair can be summarized as follows:
18As in B-B, the coe¢ cient on the square of capital-labor di¤erences is insignicant and we do not report
it.
19When we run all the specications without including the variable Polity, we obtain very similar results
with the exception of DROWSK, which becomes insignicant for signing an FTA.
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Actual
Predicted EIA no EIA
EIA 1 2
no EIA 3 4
If instead of considering a 0.5 cut-point, we select a cut-point of 0.4, we of course would
have di¤erent count values in each category, and this would be true of any cut-point chosen.
Though a predicted probability of 0.5 is standard, we want to provide a richer picture. In-
deed, Cameron and Trivedi (2005) highlight that a probability of 0.5 may be not appropriate
depending on the sample.20 Suppose a sample with most of country-pairs involve in an agree-
ment, all predicted probabilities are likely to be above 0.5 (and classied accordingly). Thus,
a range of cut-points have to be considered in order to avoid arbitrary thresholds. We follow
other studies that use the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) to
compare the predictive accuracy of several models.21 Basically, for each possible cut-point,
there is a sensitivity measure (number of true positives over the number of true positives and
false negatives) and a specicity measure (number of true negatives over the number of true
negatives and false positives). The receiver operating characteristic curve is generated from
these measures. A perfect cut-point would classify subjects such as sensitivity and specicity
would equal one (that is a ROC curve that passes through the upper left corner).
In Figure 3, we plot the ROC curves that correspond to specication (1), (2) and (3) in
Table 1. We also run the specications (1) and (2) to predict FTA signatures. Since the ROC
areas (0.891 and 0.866) is higher in case of specication (2), it seems that this model performs
better than others to predict FTA and EIA signatures.22 Although specications (1) and (2)
generate similar predictions, the ROC curve resulting from specication (2) outperforms the
20See page 474.
21The receiver operating characteristic analysis is generally utilized in medecine. See also Schularick and
Taylor (2012) for an application on nancial crises. Note that these curves can be generated from probit
and logit predictions.
See Cleves (2002) for more details.
22To discriminate between several models, it is recommended to use the same set of observations. Thus,
the sample is reduced to similar observations (4272).
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other ones indicating that the political determinant is an important determinant of trade
agreements.23
We began this subsection stating that we are making a potentially naïve" assumption
that the decision to sign an EIA is completely independent of the decision to sign an FTA.
On the one hand, this is not very far fetched as there is no formal requirement that links
the two decisions. Two countries (or groups of countries) can legally sign an EIA without
an FTA and they have certainly signed FTAs without having an EIA. However, what is
done in practice (according to the data) is that an EIA is not signed unless an FTA has
also already been signed or at least signed in conjunction with an EIA. We account for the
possible interdependence in the next three subsections.
4.2 FTA as a Prerequisite
As mentioned, there is no legal requirement to sign an FTA before signing an EIA, yet this is
prevalent in the data. That is, when two countries decide to sign an EIA, either an FTA has
been previously signed between the two countries or the two agreements are signed jointly.
This seems reasonable as there is a xed cost to learn how to negotiate and build relationships
with di¤erent countries. Moreover, since goods trade has historically been and still is the
bulk of trade value, it makes sense that countries would start with an FTA. Therefore, we
ask the question: given that two countries have an FTA, what are the characteristics that
would make them more likely to sign an EIA? We present our results for this question in
Table 2.
There are few interesting changes in our results to point out. The rst is that our
coe¢ cient for Natural is now negative and signicant. This means that given two countries
have already signed or are signing an agreement on goods, relatively close countries are less
likely to additionally sign an EIA. This result needs to be taken with caution as countries
that geographically close to each other tend to sign an FTA; i.e. we are analyzing a set of
23We run the tests of equality of ROC areas. Our results indicate that we reject the null-hypothesis
suggesting that the three specications di¤er in their predictive ability.
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already natural" trading partners. The same logic needs to be taken into account when
interpreting the change in sign for our RGDP and DRGP variables as these coe¢ cients are
not signicant in all specications. The signs for our other variables are consistent with our
previous ndings and fairly robust. Note that our ability to correctly predict signatures is
not signicantly di¤erent than in Table 1. The ROC curves are presented in Figure 4.
4.3 Seemingly Unrelated
Though informative, it is not clear that reducing the sample size and focusing only on the
country pairs that have already signed an FTA is the best approach. Therefore, we next
consider the situation in which the decision to sign either an EIA or FTA are separate but
we allow for the possibility that the errors of the two decisions are correlated. In Table 3,
we present the results of a Bivariate Probit. These results are very similar and in some
cases nearly identical to our baseline results in Table 1. The determinants in both stages are
similar. When countries di¤er in terms of economic size, they tend to sign an FTA, while
the remoteness discourages them. However, these two variable seem to have no impact on
the signature of an EIA. The coe¢ cient for the Polity variable is positive and signicant in
both stages. The coverage of trade negotiations expands with the political stability of both
countries. Note that this stability may be particularly important for EIAs as negotiations
on services do not deal with observable tari¤ cuts but with market access that the non-
application can be more di¢ cult to prove.
As the test that  is equal to zero is rejected, we can conclude that the decision to
sign a FTA and the decision to sign an EIA are interrelated in all specications. Thus,
it is appropriate to be interested in the joint probabilities rather than both probabilities
independently, though it does not appear to have a signicant e¤ect on our coe¢ cients.24
24We also run an ordered Probit in which the outcome is zero if no agreement is signed, one if the two
countries sign an FTA and two if both FTA and EIA are signed. We obtain results in line with what
we observe in Table 3, except that the variable Remote turns signicant in all specications. Results are
available upon request.
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4.4 Agreement composition
In Table 4, we distinguish countries according to their incomes into two groups: developing
countries and developed countries. We run a Bivariate Probit when one country is in the
developing countries group and the other is a developed country and another specication
when both countries are developing countries. Note that we cannot present the results
of a Bivariate Probit for trade agreement signed between two developed countries, as we
have too few observations, and almost all variables turn insignicant. Our results indicate
that trade agreement signatures between developing and developed countries depend on
political stability, economic sizes as well as di¤erence in incomes. When both countries are
developing countries, the coe¢ cient of Natural is large and highly signicant, highlighting
the importance of geographical determinants. Developing countries tend to favor neighbored
trading partners. In addition, we nd evidence of interdependent decisions for all sub-
samples.
5 Conclusion
Our goal was to highlight that trade in services is di¤erent than trade in goods and this
needs to be accounted for when trying to understand why countries sign agreements for
services trade. Over the past decade, trade in services and consequently trade agreements
in services have become increasingly important. We take the di¤erences in trade in goods
and services seriously and investigate if these di¤erences translate into di¤ering economic
determinants. Though we expect and nd similarities, we also nd di¤erences. In particular,
geography seems to be less important to determine the signatures of trade agreements on
services; but economic determinants remain signicant for both types of trade agreement.
We nd that smaller gains are experienced when trading partners di¤er widely in terms of
economic size and factor endowments which is line with Markusen and Strand (2008, 2009).
Though we nd a similar result for signing FTAs, B-B nd a positive e¤ect for di¤erences
17
in capital-labor ratios with a di¤erent data set. Furthermore, we nd that di¤erences in
skilled-unskilled labor ratio with the rest of the world is positive and signicant for EIAs
but insignicant for FTAs.
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Figure 2: Share of Trade Agreements Signed That Include Services
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Table 1: Probit Baseline
(1) (2) (3)
FTA EIA EIA EIA
Natural (+) 0.397 0.307 0.344
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Remote (+) 0.009 0.017 0.022
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
RGDP (+) 0.020 0.103 0.061
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
DRGDP () -0.011 -0.018 -0.014
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02
DKL (+) -0.143 -0.055
(0.04) (0.05)
DROWKL () -6.344 -3.636
(0.37) (0.51)
DSKUSK -0.031
(0.04)
DROWSKUSK 0.060
(0.02)
Polity 0.573 0.895
(0.10) (0.08
Observations 8122 5772 6099
Pseudo R2 0.224 0.249 0.205
Log pseudolikelihood -1006.22 -565.42 -834.81
Standard errors in parentheses  p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:001.
Independent variables taken from 1995.
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Figure 3: ROC curves (based on Table 1)
Figure 4: ROC curves (based on Table 2)
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Table 2: Probit for an EIA given an FTA
(1) (2) (3)
EIA EIA EIA
Natural -0.404 -0.477 -0.458
(0.069) (0.100) (0.086)
Remote 0.047 0.054 0.071
(0.017) (0.021) (0.019)
RGDP -0.051 0.054 0.015
(0.016) (0.027) (0.027)
DRGDP 0.121 0.100 0.108
(0.032) (0.046) (0.050)
DKL -0.123 -0.050
(0.066) (0.081)
DROWKL -9.105 -4.266
(0.690) (0.799)
DSKUSK 0.026
(0.080)
DROWSKUSK 0.179
(0.117)
Polity 1.074 1.601
(0.163) (0.132)
Observations 846 623 708
Pseudo R2 0.354 0.409 0.324
Log pseudolikelihood -357 -214 -311
Standard errors in parentheses  p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:001.
Independent variables taken from 1995.
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Table 3: Bivariate Probit
(1) (2) (3)
FTA EIA FTA EIA FTA EIA
Natural 0.814 0.322 0.927 0.380 0.965 0.395
(0.039) (0.044) (0.0479) (0.056) (0.053) (0.064)
Remote -0.023 -0.004 -0.020 0.011 -0.030 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
RGDP 0.077 0.064 0.107 0.116 0.115 0.115
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
DRGDP -0.060 -0.016 -0.081 -0.045 -0.080 -0.039
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027)
DKL -0.123 -0.194 -0.069 -0.095 -0.013
(0.027) (0.034) (0.032) (0.045) (0.030)
DROWKL -3.380 -4.629 -2.768 -2.472 -1.546
(0.319) (0.364) (0.423) (0.605) (0.410)
DSKUSK -0.052
(0.048)
DROWSKUSK 0.059
(0.011)
Polity 0.245 0.558 0.352 0.700
(0.080) (0.097) (0.087) (0.089)
Log likelihood -1610 -1143 -991
 1.00 0.998 1.00
LR test of  = 0 1211 711 659
Observations 7776 5533 4136
Standard errors in parentheses  p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:001. Independent
variables taken from 1995.
24
Table 4: Bivariate Probit: North-South versus South-South agreements
Developing/Developed countries Developing/Developing countries
FTA EIA FTA EIA
Natural 0:653
(0:075)
 0:229
(0:088)
 1:112
(0:063)
 0:439
(0:074)

Remote -0:009
(0:016)
0:026
(0:019)
-0:021
(0:012)
 0:026
(0:017)
RGDP 0:123
(0:019)
 0:132
(0:022)
 0:086
(0:018)
 0:087
(0:027)

DRGDP -0:078
(0:027)
 -0:056
(0:029)
 -0:122
(0:033)
 -0:009
(0:037)
DKL -0:257
(0:065)
 -0:286
(0:073)
 -0:093
(0:048)
 -0:308
(0:089)

DROWKL -0:345
(1:141)
1:293
(1:243)
-2:201
(0:550)
 -4:381
(1:078)

Polity 0:100
(0:11)
0:448
(0:126)
 0:108
(0:129)
0:405
(0:128)

Log likelihood -493 -530
 1.000 1.000
LR test of  = 0 367 250
Observations 1458 3959
Standard errors in parentheses.  p < 0.01,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.1. Independent
variables taken from 1995.
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